



"Resale price maintenance," as it is commonly known, means, in
trade practice, precisely what it says, -the maintenance by a trader of
prices named by him for the resale of the articles he makes or in
which he deals, however effected.
1
In the absence of controlling statute the general federal law upon the
subject, with which alone we are here concerned, is defined in the cases
arising under the anti-trust acts and hitherto adjudged by the Supreme
Court of the United States. 2  It may be shortly and concisely stated,
i. Neither the Sherman Act3 nor the supplemental Federal Trade
Commission Act4 deprives a trader of the right freely to pursue the
announced plan of simply refusing to sell the articles he owns to those
who do not sell them at his stated prices or sell to others who do not
sell them at such prices, albeit he pursues this plan with the purpose and
effect of thus maintaining his stated prices, provided he acts alone5
in the course of a private business wholly free from unlawful monop-
oly.7 . Such a simple refusal to sell, made within the broad limitations
* Resale priee liaintenance is essentially an economic problem. We undertake
here but to state the general federal law upon the subject.
'It is originally aid customarily a manufacturer's trade practice designed to
market standard merchandise, identified and distinguished by trademark, brand
or name, at standard prices. It is a common practice today. The mere statement
and recommendation of a resale price may be effective to maintain it.
2 The law of the several states must await future consideration. Likewise the
application of the patent and copyright laws.
Act of July 2, i89o (26 Stat. at L. 2o9).
'Act of Sept. 26, 1914 (38 Stat, at L. 717).
"An act harmless when done by one may become a public wrong when done
by many acting in concert, for it then takes on the form of a conspiracy, and
may be prohibited or punished, if the result be hurtful to the public or to the
individual against whom the concerted action is directed." Grenada Lumber Co.
v. Missisppi (I91O) 217 U. S. 433, 440-441, 30 Sup. Ct. 535, 538.
'As distinguished from a public service or quasi-public service business.
' United States v. Colgate & Co. (I9I8) 250 U. S. 300, 39 Sup. Ct. 465; Federal
Trade Commission v. Beech-m1t Packing Co. (1922) 257 U. S. 441, 42 Sup Ct.
150. See also Great Atlalitic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cream of Wheat Co. (1915,.
C. C. A. 2d) 227 Fed. 46, affirming same case (1915, S. D. N. Y.) 224 Fed. 566.
It is needless to remark that the freedom of a trader to refuse to buy is coex-
tensive with his freedom to refuse t6 sell. "That any one of the persons engaged
in the retail lumber business," said the court in the Grenada Lumber Company
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defined, involves but and no more than the exercise of a clear legal right,
than the assertion of the liberty secured by the Constitution of the
United States. And, of course, a trader may announce his intention to
do what he has the legal right to do. Hence the pursuit of this plan
under the circumstances described involves neither a "contract, combina-
tion in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce" within the meaning and condemnation of the anti-trust
act nor the "unfair methods of competition in commerce" declared to
be unlawful in the said commission act supplemental to it. In short:
within the broad limitations indicated a trader may, at least, simply
(a) name, suggest, and recommend resale prices for his products to
those who buy and deal in them; (b) state to his dealers the asserted
fair and reasonable character and intrinsic economic value of such
prices and the benefit derived from their use; (c) announce his inten-
tion to refuse sales to all who sell at other prices or to those who sell
at other prices; and (d) refuse sales to them.
2. But a trader may not, consistently with the Sherman Act, sell the
articles he makes or in which he deals to others and yet by contract
with them fix the price of future sales." It matters not whether the
contracts are oral or written, are express or implied from a course
of dealing or other circumstancesY They are effective to create a com-
bination for the prohibited purposes and involve a restraint of trade
invalid at common law and under the act, wherefore they are void and
case, supra, note i, at p. 440, 30 Sup. Ct. at p. 538, "might have made a fixed rule
of conduct not to buy his stock from a producer or wholesaler who should sell
to consumers in competition with himself, is plain. No law which would infringe
his freedom of contract in that particular would stand. But when the plaintiffs
in error combine and agree that no one of them will trade with any producer
or wholesaler who shall sell to a consumer within the trade range of any of
them, quite another case is presented." And the fundamental right of freedom
to trade is analogous to the fundamental right of the individual to sell his labor
or not, as he pleases, to whom he pleases. Adair v. United States (i9o8) 2o8
U. S. 161, 28 Sup. Ct. 277.
It is interesting to note that the remaining anti-trust act, the supplemental
Clayton Act, provides in Section 2, prohibiting price discrimination between pur-
chasers where its effect may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly in any line of commerce, that "nothing herein contained shall
prevent persons engaged in selling goods, wares, or merchandise in commerce
from selecting their own customers in bona fide transactions and not in restraint
of trade." Act of October 15, 1914 (38 Stat. at L. 73o).
8Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co. (1911) 220 U. S. 373,
31 Sup. Ct. 376; Boston Store of Chicago v. American Graphophone Co. et al.
(1918) 246 U. S. 8, 38 Sup. Ct 257; United States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc.
(1920) 252 U. S. 85, 40 Sup. Ct. 251. Likewise a trader may not, consistently
with the Sherman Act, sell his products subject to contracts with his dealers
designed and effective to prevent them from selling such products to those who
do not resell at prices thus fixed by him.
The rule does not apply to a single and incidental transaction conceivably
unrelated to the public interest. And it may be relaxed in an exceptional case
involving "a very special kind of property." Suffice it here to say that ordinary
articles of merchandise commonly sold in trade and commerce are not property
of that kind.
' United States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc. supra note 8; Frey & Son, Inc. v.
Cudahy Packing Co. (1921) 256 U. S. 208, 41 Sup. Ct. 451.
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unenforceable. And the validity of such restrictive contracts is not
saved by the fact that the prices they fix are reasonable, that they bene-
fit the parties. Neither is their validity saved by the fact that they are
made without any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, that they
are limited to fix wholesale, and not retail, prices.
3. Likewise a trader may not, consistently with the supplemental
Federal Trade Commission Act, sell the articles he makes or in which
he deals by the use of methods which involve co-operation with his
dealers whereby together they undertake to prevent those who do not
resell at his stated prices from obtaining his products and others from
obtaining them at less than such prices, methods which, while they may
not amount to agreements to fix and maintain resale prices, are equally
and actually as effectual to restrain the natural flow of commerce and
to suppress the freedom of competition in the channels of interstate
commerce.10 And the validity of such methods is not saved by the
circumstance that they are used incidentally to and in furtherance of the
pursuit of the lawful plan of simply refusing to sell, hereinbefore
described, since they transcend its limitations.
II
THE CONTROLLING PRINCIPLE
The controlling principle is the common-law right of freedom to
trade which it is the public policy, declared by the anti-trust acts, to
preserve and maintain, which is, therefore, the law of the land."
1 The
right of freedom of alienation is an essential incident to a right of gen-
eral property in movables, and restraints upon it are usually regarded
as obnoxious to the public interest which is deemed to be best served
by great freedom of traffic in such things as pass from hand to hand.
Before sale he who owns movables has all the rights of ownership with
respect thereto, including the right of simple refusal to sell. But he
cannot, consistently with the general law, grant his whole title to such
movables (ordinary articles of commerce) by sale for a full price
satisfactory to him and yet reserve and retain the incidents of it, at
least, to the extent of fixing and limiting the future price by contract.
To do so would be at one and the same time to sell and retain, to part
with and yet to hold, to project his will so as to cause it to control the
movable parted with when it is not subject to his will because owned
by another, and thus to keep property sold subject to a restriction hos-
tile to the title and the right of freedom of alienation incident to it and
to make the will of the seller unwarrantably take the place of the law
of the land as to such movables. Having exercised and exhausted his
right of ownership by sale and thus by his own voluntary act conveyed
his entire interest in the movable, it passes beyond his dominion out
"°Federal Trade Commission v. Beech-Nut Packing Co. supra note 7. What
are unlawful co6perative viethods is illustrated by the modified Beech-Nut order,
infra at p. ooo..
"See the cases cited, supra.
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into the channels of trade and becomes the property of another who
has the right freely to sell what he owns, and the public is entitled




"Every manufacturer," said the court in the Miles case, 2 "before
sale, controls the articles he makes. With respect to these, he has the
right of ownership .... But," the court adds, "because a manufacturer
is not bound to make or sell, it does not follow that in case of sales
actually made he may impose upon purchasers every sort*of restric-
tion ..... .Whatever right the manufacturer may have to project his
control beyond his own sales must depend," continued the court, in the
absence, of course, of statutory right, "not upon an inherent power inci-
dent to production and original ownership, but upon agreement."' 3
With this definitive and prophetic statement the law opens. And the
question was whether, in the absence of statutory right and consistently
with the general law, a manufacturer may sell the articles' 4 he makes
and yet systematically 5 by contract'16 fix and maintain the price for
"Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., supra note 8.
"Ibid. at pp. 403, 404, 405, 31 Sup. Ct. at p. 383 et seq.
"The fact that-the article is a proprietary medicine compounded by a secret
formula does not take it without the rule. The court said: "No distinction can
properly be made by reason of the particular character of the commodity in
question. It is not entitled to special privilege or immunity. It is an article of
commerce and the rules concerning the freedom of trade must be held to apply
to it. Nor does the fact that the margin of freedom is reduced by the control
of production make the protection of what remains, in such a case, a negligible
matter. And where commodities have passed into the channels of trade and are
owned by dealers, the validity of agreements to prevent competition and to main-
tain prices is not to be determined by the circumstances whether they were pro-
duced by several manufacturers or by one, or whether they were previously
owned by one or by many." Ibid. at pp. 408-409, 31 Sup. Ct. at p. 385.
" We are not dealing here, the court observed, "with a single transaction, con-
ceivably unrelated to the public interest," but with "a system of interlocking
restrictions by which the complainant seeks to control not merely the prices at
which its agents may sell its products, but the prices for all sales by all dealers
at wholesale or retail, whether purchasers or subpurchasers, and thus to fix the
amount which the consumer shall pay, eliminating all competition." Ibid. at pp.
399, 407, 31 Sup. Ct. at pp. 381, 384. And it is apparently upon this ground that
the court distinguishes Elliman, Sons & Co. v. Carrington & Son, Limited [igoi]
2 Ch. 275. See also Garst v. Harris (igoo) 177 Mass. 72, 58 N. E. 174; Garst v.
Charles (i9o5) 187 Mass. 144, 72 N. E. 839; Clark v. Frank (1885) 17 Mo. App.
6o2; Grogan v. Chaffee (19o9) 156 Calif. 611; 105 Pac. 745; Ghirardelli v.
Hunsicker (1912) 164 Calif. 355, 128 Pac. 1O41; Fisher Flouring Mills Co. v.
Swanson (1913) 76 Wash. 649, 137 Pac. 144.
In the Hartman case (153 Feb. 24) Judge Lurton said (p. 43): "A general
system of contracts, such as that which complainant seeks to enforce and which
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future sales.1 7  It arose upon a demurrer to a bill to enjoin the defend-
ant from inducing any party to said contract to violate it.
That such contracts restrain trade, in fact, "is obvious." '  And the
test of their validity is whether, when construed in the light of the nature
of their restraint, the attending circumstances and the paramount public
interest, they are reasonable. If not, they are void as against public
policy. Speaking through Mr. Justice Hughes, the court said :'9
"With respect to contracts in restraint of trade, the earlier doctrine
of the common law has been substantially modified in adaptation to
modern conditions. But the public interest is still the first considera-
tion. To sustain the restraint, it must be found to be reasonable both
with respect to the public and to the parties and that it is limited to
what is fairly necessary, in the circumstances of the particular case,
for the pf6tection of the covenantee. Otherwise restraints of trade
are void as against public policy. As was said by this court in Gibbs v.
Baltimore Gas Co., 13o U. S. p. 409, 'The decision in Mitchell v.
Reynolds. i P. Wms. 181; S. C., Smith's Leading Cases, 407, 7th Eng.
ed.; 8th Am. ed. 756, is the foundation of the rule in relation to the
invalidity of contracts in restraint of trade; but as it was made under
a condition of things, and a state of society, different from those which
now prevail, the rule laid down is not regarded as inflexible, and has
been considerably modified. Public welfare is first considered, and if
it is not involved, and the restraint upon one party is not greater than
protection to the other party requires, the contract may be sustained.
The question is, whether, under the particular circumstances of the
case and the nature of the particular contract involved in it, the con-
tract is, or is not, unreasonable. Rousillon v. Rousillon, 14 Ch. D. 351;
Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 345.'
" 'The true view at the present time,' said Lord Macnaghten in Nor-
denfelt v. Maxim-Nordenfelt & Co., 19o4, A. C. p. 565, 'I think, is this:
The public have an interest in every person's carrying on his trade
freely; so has the individual. All interference with individual liberty
the bill avers is a method generally adopted in his line of business, involves very
different questions from those which arise when a single contract only is involved
and when the action is between the contracting parties for a breach, as was the
case in Garst v. Harris, 177 Mass. 72, 58 N. E. 174, and Ellimn v. Carrington,
L. R. 19O1, 2 Ch. Div. 275." Again (p. 41) : "The reasons which might uphold
covenants restricting the liberty of a single buyer might prove quite inadequate
when there are a multitude of identical agreements. The single covenant might
in no way affect the public interest, when a large number might. * * * A com-
mon purpose unites each covenantee to every other and the 'system' is to be
construed as 'one piece,' in which the complainant and every assenting dealer,
whether wholesaler or retailer, is a party, and the agreement of each such
covenantee to sell only at the prices dictated by the manufacturer constitutes one
general scheme."
"G Here an express written contract.
' "Nor can the manufacturer by rule and notice," said the court, "in the absence
of contract or statutory right, even though the restriction be known to pur-
chasers, fix prices for future sales." Ibid. 405, 31 Sup. Ct. 383. See Bobbs-
Merrill 6& Co. v. Straus (9o8) 210 U. S. 339, 28 Sup. Ct. 722.
"Ibid. 400, 31 Sup. Ct. 381.
"Ibid. 4o6-407, 31 Sup. Ct. 384.
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of action in trading, and all restraints of trade of themselves, if there
is nothing more, are contrary to public policy, and therefore void.
That is the general rule. But there are exceptions: restraints of trade
and interference with individual liberty of action may be justified by
the special circumstances of a particular case. It is a sufficient justifi-
cation, and indeed it is the only justification, if the restriction is rea-
sonable-reasonable, that is, in reference to the interests of the parties
concerned and reasonable in reference to the interests of the public,
so framed and so guarded as to afford adequate protection to the party
in whose favor it is imposed, while at the same time it is in no way
injurious to the public.' "
. Applying this test the court holds that the restraint upon the future
price imposed by the contracts is obnoxious to the public interest and
contrary to the public policy, declared by the Sherman Act, and, there-
fore, the contracts are invalid both at common law and under that act.
This for the reason that it offends against the general rule of the right
of freedom to trade which is the law of the land.2 ' That is to say, the
contracts violate the rule against restraints upon the right of freedom
of alienation of movables sold to and owned by another. They are
designed and effective, if valid and enforced, to qualify the title of
those who buy and trade in the articles made by the manufacturer, to
restrict their right freely to sell the property they own, and to prevent
competition between them in its sale.2'
" See, also, the Boston Store and Colgate cases, infra at pp. 684 and 685 respec-
tively.
"Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co. supra note 8. The court
said in part: "The contracts relate to an article of commerce and the rules con-
cerning the freedom of trade must be held to apply to it;" (ibid. 408, 31 Sup. Ct.
385) ; they restrict "the freedom of trade on the part of dealers who own what
they sell" (ibid. 407, 408, 31 Sup. Ct. 384) and constitute a plan which, "in effect,
creates a combination (between the manufacturer and his dealers) for the pro-
hibited purposes" (ibid. 408, 31 Sup. Ct. 384) ; "it certainly cannot be said that
there is no public interest in maintaining freedom of trade with respect to future
sales after the article has been placed on the market and the producer has parted
with his title" (ibid. 403, 31 Sup. Ct. 383). Again: "The agreements are
designed to maintain prices, after the complainant (manufacturer) has parted
with the title to the articles, and to prevent competition among those who trade
in them (ibid. 4o7, 31 Sup. Ct. 384). "The complainant having sold its products
at prices satisfactory to itself, the public is entitled to whatever advantage may
be derived from competition in the subsequent traffic" (ibid. 4o9, 31 Sup. Ct. 385).
"The present case is not analogous," remarked the court, (ibid. 407, 31 Sup. Ct.
384) "to that of a sale of good will, or of an interest in a business, or of the
grant of a right to use a process of manufacture. The complainant has not
parted with any interest in its business or instrumentalities of production. It has
conferred no right by virtue of which purchasers of its products may compete
with it. It retains complete control over the business in which it is engaged,
manufacturing what it pleases and fixing such prices for its own sales as it may
desire." "The questions involved," the court concluded, (ibid. 409, 31 Sup. Ct.
385) "were carefully considered and the decisions reviewed by Judge Lurton in
delivering the opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals in Park v. Hartman
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It was sought to justify the contracts upon the ground that they pre-
vent damage to the manufacturer's business asserted to result from
sales at less than the prices fixed by him, prices which are reasonable
and benefit him. But, the court tersely replied, the advantage thus
derived by the parties does not suffice to sustain contracts effective to
restrain the right of freedom to trade and to destroy the freedom of
competition which it is the declared public policy to preserve and
secure.
22
Mr. Justice Holmes dissented,
23 saying in part :24 , . . . .I suppose
that the reason why the contract is held bad is that it is part of a scheme
embracing other similar contracts each of which applies to a number
of similar things, with the object of fixing a general market price.
This reason seems to me inadequate in the case before the court. In
the first place by a slight change in the form of the contract the plain-
tiff can accomplish the result in a way that would be beyond successful
attack. If it should make the retail dealers also agents in law as well
as in name and retain the title until the goods left their hands I can-
[Io7, C. C. A. 6th, 153 Fed. 24] supra, and, in following that case, it was con-
cluded below [i9o8, C. C. A. 6th, 164 Fed. 8o3] that the restrictions sought to
be enforced by the bill were invalid both at common law and under the act of
Congress of July 2, i89o. We think that the court was right." Judge Lurton
was a member of the Supreme Court when the Miles case was heard and decided,
but took no part in its consideration and decision. His opinion for the Circuit
Court of Appeals in the Hartman case is the foundation of the opinion of the
Supreme Court in the Miles case. Hence we shall refer to it.
"A prime objection to the enforcability of such a system of restraint upon
sales and prices," said Judge Lurton in the course of the learned opinion of the
Circuit Court of Appeals in the Hartman case (153 Fed. at p. 39) which the
Supreme Court quotes with approval (2o U. S. 404-405, 31 Sup. Ct 383) "is
that they offend against the ordinary and usual freedom of traffic in chattels or
articles which pass by mere delivery. The right of alienation is one of the
essential incidents of a right of general property in movables, and restraints
upon alienation have been generally regarded as obnoxious to public policy, which
is best subserved by great freedom of traffic in such things as pass from hand to
hand."
The Supreme Court also refers to Gray, Restraints on the Alienation of Prop-
erty, secs. 27, 28, who says (2d ed. 1895) at sec. 27: "A condition or conditional
limitation on alienation attached to a transfer of the entire interest in personalty
is as void as if attached to a fee simple in land."
"Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., supra note 8 at pp.
407-408, 31 Sup. Ct. 384-385.
The question was not new to Mr. Justice Holmes, since, as Chief Justice of
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, he wrote the opinion in Garst v.
Harris (igoo) 177 Mass. 72, 58 N. E. 174. That case involved an action to recover
damages for breach of an agreement not to sell a proprietary medicine below a
stipulated price. Judgment was for the plaintiff. The court said (at p. 74, 58
N. E. 174) : "It is said that the contract was unlawful as in restraint of trade.
* * * When, as here, there is a secret composition, which the defendant pre-
sumedly would have no chance to sell at a profit at all but for the plaintiff's
permission, a limit to the license, in the form of a restriction of the price at
which he may sell, is proper enough."
" Ibid. 411, 412, 31 Sup. Ct 386.
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not conceive that even the present enthusiasm for regulating the prices
to be charged by other people would deny that the owner was acting
within his rights.2 5 It seems to me that this consideration by itself ought
to give us pause ... "
"I cannot believe that in the long run the public will profit by this
court permitting knaves to cut reasonable prices for some ulterior pur-
pose of their own and thus to impair, if not to destroy, the production
and sale of articles which it is assumed to be desirable that the public
should be able to get."
While the Bauer case2 6 did not involve the application of the general
law, we may incidentally note its decision. It presented the question
whether the exclusive right to "vend" secured by the patent law
includes the right, by notice attached to the patented article, to fix and
limit the price of future sales. And the court held that it does not.
Speaking through Mr. Justice Day the court said :27
"The right to vend conferred by the patent law has been exercised,
and the added restriction is beyond the protection and purpose of the
act. This being so, the case is brought within that line of cases in
which this court from the beginning has held that a patentee who has
parted with a patented machine by passing title to a purchaser has placed
the article beyond the limits of the monopoly secured by the patent act."
Mr. Justice McKenna, Mr. Justice Holmes, Mr. Justice Lurton, and
Mr. Justice VanDevanter dissented, without stated opinion.
The Victor Talking Machine Company case 28 likewise involved the
construction of the patent law. Here a manufacturer sought to sell
a patented phonograph subject to a "license notice" attached to it and
a "license contract"' with dealers fixing a minimum price at which it
should be resold, under the guise of exercising the exclusive right to
"use" secured by the patent law. In the course of its opinion condemn-
ing the plan, the court, speaking through Mr. Justice Clark, said :29
"...c . it is plainly apparent that this plan of marketing adopted by
the plaintiff is, in substance, the one dealt with by the court in Dr. Miles
Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373, and in Bauer v. O'Don-
nell, 229 U. S. i, adroitly modified on the one hand to take advantage,
if possible, of distinctions suggested by these decisions, and on the
other hand to evade certain supposed effects of them....
"Courts would be perversely blind if they failed to look through
such an attempt as this 'License Notice' plainly is to sell property for
a full price, and yet to place restraints upon its further alienation, such
as have been hateful to the law from Lord Coke's day to ours, because
' In the case of Federal Trade Commission v. The Cirtis Publishing Co.
(January 8, 1923) 43 Sup. Ct. 210 it was held that a contract of agency stipulat-
ing, inter alia, the sales price and systematically used in the sale of periodicals
does not offend against the Federal Trade Commission Act.
'Bauer & Cie v. O'Donnell (1913) 229 U. S. I, 33 Sup. Ct. 616.
" Ibid. 17, 33 Sup. Ct. 620.
'Straus et al. v. Victor Talking Machine Co. (1917) 243 U. S. 490, 37 Sup.
Ct. 412.
Ibid. pp. 498, 500-501, 37 Sup. Ct. 414, 415.
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obnoxious to the public interest.... Convinced as we are that the pur-
pose and effect of this 'License Notic& of plaintiff, considered as a
part of its scheme for marketing its product, is not to secure to the
plaintiff any use of its machines, such as is contemplated by the patent
law statutes, but that its real and poorly concealed purpose is to restrict
the price of them, after the plaintiff had been paid for them and after
they have passed into the possession of dealers and the public, we con-
clude that it falls within the principles of Adams v. Burke, 17 Wall 453,
456; and of Bauer v. O'Donnell, 229 U. S. I; that it is therefore,
invalid . .. ."
Mr. Justice McKenna, Mr. Justice Holmes, and Mr. Justice Van-
Devanter dissented, without stated opinion.
The Boston Store case3° again presented the question whether a
manufacturer may sell the articles he makes and yet, consistently with
the general law, fix their future price by a system of uniform contracts
with his dealers. And again the court answered No.3 1  The question
arose out of a suit to enjoin the Boston Store from selling at less than
the price fixed in its contract with the manufacturer.
Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice VanDevanter dissented, with-
out stated opinion.
It is needless to dwell upon the authoritative value of the opinion of
the court in the Boston Store case, containing, as it does, a careful,
definitive, and approving review of its prior decisions upon the subject
and a clear statement of the fundamental ground upon which they rest.
That is manifest. As a result of the opinion and decision in this case
it is now made plain that the rule of the Miles case is settled law. That
the court declares in language which admits of no doubt. That Mr.
Justice Brandeis, who before he became a member of the court was
'Boston Store of Chicago v. American Graphophone Co. et al. (i918) 246
U. S. 8, 38 Sup. Ct. 8.
' Mr. Justice Brandeis filed a c6ncurring opinion in which he said: (Ibid. 27-28,
38 Sup. Ct. 261-262) "Whether a producer of goods should be permitted to fix
by contract, express or implied, the price at which the purchaser may resell them,
and if so, under what conditions, is an economic question. [This is the first
formal recognition of the fact, later declared by the court in the Schrader case,
that the contracts condemned may be express or implied.] To decide it wisely
it is necessary to consider the relevant facts, industrial and commercial, rather
than established legal principles. On that question I have expressed elsewhere
views which differ materially from those entertained by a majority of my
brethren. I concur, however, in the answers given herein to all the questions
certified; because I consider that the series of cases referred to in the opinion
settles the law for this court. If the rule so declared is believed to be harmful
in its operation, the remedy may be found, as it has been sought, through appli-
cation to the Congress or relief may possibly be given by the Federal Trade
Commission which has also been applied to."
Congress has, as yet, declined to enact legislation designed to make lawful
what is prohibited as a result of the decision in the Miles case. The value of
such legislation has been strongly urged. The adverse opinion of the Federal
Trade Commission is plainly declared in the order challenged in the Beech-Mut
case, infra note 66. For the substance of the order see infra p. 696.
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the foremost advocate of the economic value of standard resale prices,
concedes in his concurring opinion.32
The Colgate case 3 presented the quite different question whether a
manufacturer, acting alone in the course of a private business wholly free
from unlawful monopoly, may consistently with the Sherman Act, pur-
sue the announced plan of simply refusing to sell the articles he makes
and owns to dealers who do not resell them at his stated prices, with the
purpose and effect of maintaining such prices-who, when he does sell,
imposes no restraint, by agreement, express or implied, upon the price
of future sales. And the court unanimously held that he may, since such
refusals involve but and no more than the exercise of the long recog-
nized right of a trader freely to select his own customers, but and no
more than the exertion of the fundamental common-law right of free-
dom to trade which the Sherman Act was enacted to preserve and,
therefore, does not impair. And, of course, a trader may announce
his intention to do what he has a legal right to do.
An indictment 34 charged that Colgate & Company, a producer of
laundry soaps, toilet soaps, and other toilet articles and selling and
shipping such articles to wholesale and retail dealers throughout the
United States, knowingly and unlawfully created and engaged in a
combination with such dealers to procure their adherence to prices fixed
by it in reselling its said products and to prevent them from reselling
said products at lower prices and thus to suppress competition arihongst
them in restraint of interstate trade and commerce in said products in
violation of the Sherman Act; that with the purpose and effect of induc-
ing its dealers to adhere to the prices fixed by it in their resale of its said
products and of preventing them from reselling said products at lower
prices and of suppressing competition amongst them in reselling said
products, the company did the things hereinafter alleged to have been
done by it and with the same purpose and effect induced many of its
dealers throughout the United States to do the things hereinafter
alleged to have been done by them; the company35 (i) distributed
amongst the wholesale and retail dealers in its products, letters, tele-
grams, circulars, and lists showing uniform wholesale and retail prices
to be charged for its said products; (2) urged such dealers, by letters
and circulars and orally, to adhere to the prices thus indicated in resell-
ing said products; (3) informed such dealers, by letters and circulars
and orally, that it would refuse to sell its products to any dealer who
did not resell them at the prices thus indicated; (4) requested such
dealers, orally and by letters, to inform it of sales by dealers at prices
other than those so indicated, and, induced by such requests, many
'2Supra note 31.
United States v. Colgate & Co. (1919) 250 U. S. 300, 39 Sup. Ct. 465.
'The indictment is literally stated.
' Compare with the facts found in the Beech-Nut case, discussed infra p. 696
et seq.
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dealers informed it of such sales; (5) thus secured from many such
dealers information as to many such sales; (6) investigated and dis-
covered, through its representatives, agents and employes, other sales
by its dealers at prices other than those so indicated by it; (7) placed
the names of dealers whom it ascertained to have made such sales at
other prices on "Suspended Lists," so-called; (8) requested the dealers
whom it ascertained to have made such sales at other prices to give it
assurances and promises that they would in future resell its products
at the prices which it indicated; (9) uniformly refused to sell its pro-
ducts to dealers who had made sales at prices other than those indi-
cated by it until they gave assurances and promises that they would
thereafter resell its products at the prices which it indicated, and,
induced by such requests and refusals, many dealers who had sold its pro-
ducts at prices other than those indicated by it gave to it assutances and
promises that they would thereafter resell its products at the prices
indicated by it; (IO) thus procured many such assurances and promises
from dealers throughout the United States and, upon their receipt,
sold its products to the dealers who gave such assurances and promises;
(ii) requested similar assurances and promises from dealers to whom
it had not previously sold its products, upon opening accounts with
them, and many such dealers, induced by such requests, gave such
assurances and promises to it, and it thereupon sold its products to
them; (12) freely sold its products to dealers with whom it had estab-
lished accounts and who had not resold such products at prices other
than those indicated by it; that by reason of the foregoing, wholesale
dealers throughout the United States, with few exceptions, resold its
said products at the uniform prices fixed by the company and refused
to resell such products to retail dealers at lower prices; that for the
same reason retail dealers throughout the United States resold its said
products at the uniform prices fixed by the company and refused to sell
such products to the consuming public at lower prices; that thus com-
petition in the sale of such products, by wholesale dealers to retail
dealers and by retail dealers to the consuming public, was suppressed
and the prices of such products to the retail dealers and to the consum-
ing public throughout the United States were maintained and enhanced.
The District Court sustained a demurrer to the indictment 36 upon the
ground that "the averments of the indictment, when carefully con-
sidered, and read in the light of the defendant's inalienable right to
deal lawfully with his own property, the handling, trading in, and dis-
posing of which is made the subject of this indictment, fail to charge
any offense, either in restraint of trade and commerce, under the Sher-
man Act, or any other law of the United States.' 37 Judge Waddill
said :38




"No suggestion is made that the conduct complained of was a monop-
oly, or was an attempt to monopolize the trade in toilet and laundry
soaps, and other articles referred to; that the defendant was in a posi-
tion to effect such purpose; that its business bore any appreciable pro-
portion to the general extent of the business in question; or that the
defendant was under any special duty or obligation to the public, not
applicable to all citizens alike in other private businesses, to manufac-
ture its products ....
And then the District Judge made this definitive statement,3 9 later
accepted by the Supreme Court as conclusive of the construction of
the indictment:
"The pregnant fact should never be lost sight of that no averment
is made of any contract or agreement having been entered into whereby
the defendant, the manufacturer, and his customers, bound themselves
to enhance and maintain prices, further than is involved in the circum-
stance that the manufacturer, the defendant here, refused to sell to
persons who would not resell at indicated prices, and that certain
retailers made purchases on this condition, whereas, inferentially, others
declined so to do. No suggestion is made that the defendant, the
manufacturer, attempted to reserve or retain any interest in the goods
sold, or to restrain the vendee in his right to barter and sell the same
without restriction. The retailer, after buying, could, if he chose, give
away his purchase, or sell it at any price he saw fit or not sell it at all;
his course in these respects being affected only by the fact that he
might by his action incur the displeasure of the manufacturer, who
could refuse to make further sales to him, as he had the undoubted
right to do. There is no charge that the retailers themselves entered
into any combination or agreement with each other, or that the defend-
ant acted other than with his customers individually."
Thereupon a second indictment was returned against Colgate & Com-
pany identical, in substance, with that condemned by the District Court
with the exception of the addition of a new paragraph stating that
"amongst other dealers, wholesale and retail, in the products of the
defendant, in the eastern district of Virginia, who engaged in the afore-
said combination with the defendant, were John A. Gill Grocery Co.
(Inc.), Dunnavent & Cook, and Gill Brothers Co., all doing business
at Petersburg, Virginia, who, at that time, on or about February 6 or 7,
1917, agreed with the defendant to resell its products at the prices fixed
by it as aforesaid," to correct the formal defect found in the first indict-
ment. Regardless of the fact that the second indictment expressly
charged, as the first indictment did not, that dealers agreed with the
company to resell its products at the prices fixed by it, the District
Court sustained a demurrer to it upon the ground and for the reasons
that it sustained the demurrer to the first indictment." "For reasons
stated in the opinion filed on the 29 th day of October, 1918, in the case
'Ibid. 527. The District Judge later explicitly says that the indictment con-
tains no averment of any agreement between the Company and its dealers to
maintain prices fixed by it.
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of United States v. Colgate & Company, a corporation, No. 1294,"
said District Judge Waddill, ° "the demurrer to this indictment is sus-
tained in so far as it avers that the indictment fails to charge any offense
under the Sherman Act, or any other law of the United States. So far
as the substance of this indictment is concerned, and the conduct or acts
charged, I construe this indictment as I construed the former indict-
ment in the above mentioned opinion. The demurrer is overruled in
so far as it raises questions as to the form of the indictment." In
short, the District Court construes the second indictment to contain no
charge of any agreement between the company and its dealers to main-
tain prices fixed by it and, upon that ground, condemns the indictment,
in the face of a direct and explicit charge of such an agreement.
Upon writ of error the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the
judgment of the District Court.41 Speaking through Mr. Justice McReyn-
olds the court first pointed out that "upon such a writ 'we have no
authority to revise the mere interpretation of an indictment and are
confined to ascertaining whether the court in a case under review erro-
neously construed the statute.' 'We must accept that court's interpre-
tation of the indictments and confine our review to the question of the
construction of the statute involved in the decision.' United States v.
Carter, 231 V. S. 492, 493; United States v. Miller, 223 U. S. 599,
602 ;,,42 that "we are confronted by an uncertain interpretation of an
indictment itself couched in rather vague and general language.
Counsel differ radically concerning the meaning of the opinion below
and there is much room for the controversy between them." 43  The
indictment," continued the courtY4 "runs only against Colgate & Com-
pany, a corporation engaged in manufacturing soap and toilet articles
and selling them throughout the Union. It makes no reference to
monopoly, and proceeds solely upon the theory of an unlawful combina-
tion."45
The court concluded :46
"Considering all said in the opinion (notwithstanding some serious
doubts) we are unable to accept the construction placed upon it [the
Not reported.
United States v. Colgate & Co. supra note 33.
*Ibid. 3O1-3o2, 39 Sup. Ct 466.
Ibid. 3o2, 39 Sup. Ct. 466.
'Ibid. 302, 39 Sup. Ct. 466.
'After reciting the charge and averments contained in the indictment and
quoting from the opinion of the District Judge the court defined the problem
presented: (ibid. 306, 39 Sup. Ct. 467) "Our problem is to ascertain, as accur-
ately as may be, what interpretation the trial court placed upon this indictment-
not to interpret it ourselves; and then to determine whether, so construed, it
fairly charges violation of the Sherman Act. Counsel for the Government main-
tain, in effect, that, as so interpreted, the indictment adequately charges an unlaw-
ful combination (within the doctrine of Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons
Co., 220 U. S. 373) resulting from restrictive agreements between defendant and
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indictment] by the Government. We cannot, e. g., wholly disregard
the statement that--'The retailer, after buying, could, if he chose, give
away his purchase, or sell it at any price he saw fit, or not sell it at all;
his course in these respects being affected only by the fact that he might
by his action incur the displeasure of the manufacturer, who could
refuse to make further sales to him, as he had the undoubted right to
do.' And we must conclude that, as interpreted below, the indictment
does not charge Colgate & Company with selling its products to dealers
under agreements which obligated the latter not to resell except at
prices fixed by the company. The position of the defendant is more
nearly in accord with the whole opinion and must be accepted. And
as counsel for the Government was careful to state on the argument
that this conclusion would require affirmation of the judgment below,
an extended discussion of the principles involved is unnecessary."
And then the court stated the fundamental principle underlying the
doctrine here announced in the following pregnant language :47
"The purpose of the Sherman Act is to prohibit monopolies, contracts
and combinations which probably would unduly interfere with the free
exercise of their rights by those engaged, or who wish to engage, in
trade and commerce-in a word to preserve the right of freedom to
trade. In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly,
the act does not resfrict the long recognized right of trader or man-
ufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his
own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal. And,
of course, he may announce in advance the circumstances under which
he will refuse to sell."
"In Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., supra," the court
added,48 "the unlawful combination was effected through contracts
which undertook to prevent dealers from freely exercising the right to
sell." And it is upon the ground of the absence of such restrictive
contracts that the court distinguishes this from the Miles case.
The rule of the Colgate case is clear and settled law. It is manifestly
but declarative of the ancient rule of the common law of the right of
freedom to trade, of the right of freedom of alienation incident to the
ownership of movables. In the exercise of this fundamental right a
trader may freely select his own customers, may freely refuse to sell
the articles he owns to whom he pleases, for any reason he pleases, or
for no reason if he pleases, if and where he acts alone in the course of
a private business free from unlawful monopoly. Such a simple
refusal to sell, so made, involves the exertion of an unquestioned legal
sundry dealers whereby the latter obligated themselves not to resell except at
agreed prices; and to support this p,sition they specifically rely upon the above-
quoted sentence in the opinion which begins 'In the view taken by the court,' etc.
On the other hand, defendant maintains that looking at the whole opinion it
plainly construes the indictment as alleging only recognition of the manufac-
turer's undoubted right to specify resale prices and refuse to deal with anyone
who failed to maintain the same."
'4Ibid. 306-307, 39 Sup. Ct. 467-468.
'Ibid. 307, 39 Sup. Ct. 468.
'8Ibid. 307-308, 39 Sup. Ct. 468.
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right, the assertion of the liberty secured by the Constitution of the
United States. It is a real and essential trade right, than which none
is more important, if the assured freedom of trade and competition is
to exist, a right designed to be fully and freely enjoyed, within the
broad limitations stated, in the practical conception and conduct of trade
and commerce.
The Colgate case presents a curious and extraordinary situation in
that the court is compelled to hold that an indictment does not charge an
offense against the anti-trust act upon the ground that, first, it presents
but a simple refusal to sell, whereas, under the rule of the later
Schrader49 and Frey50 cases, it presents a course of dealing to be sub-
mitted to the jury to decide whether it involves, in fact and by necessary
or reasonable implication, a combination or agreement between the
manufacturer and his dealers to fix and maintain resale prices in
restraint of interstate trade, a course of dealing which includes methods
said in the still later Beech-Nut-" case to constitute an offense against
the Federal Trade Commission Act; second, it fails to aver agreements
between the manufacturer and his dealers to fix and maintain prices
for the resale of his products, whereas, as a matter of fact, it expressly
avers such agreements. This situation arose, of course, out of the con-
struction placed upon the indictment by the lower court.
Following the decision of the Colgate case a third indictment was
returned against Colgate & Company, based upon the same facts.
This indictment was held to be sufficient, upon demurrer, and now
awaits trial.52 It contains fifty-six counts, comprises one hundred and
fifteen type-written pages, legal folio, and charges that the company
"knowingly and unlawfully created and engaged in a combination with
the said wholesale dealers and jobbers throughout the United States
to whom it sold and shipped its soap, to suppress competition amongst
the said wholesale dealers and jobbers in reselling such soap to the retail
dealers, and to procure adherence on the part of such wholesale dealers
and jobbers to uniform and enhanced resale prices in making such sales
to the retail dealers, in restraint of the above described trade and com-
merce among the several States, in violation of the Act of Congress of
July 2, 189o, "entitled 'An Act to protect trade and commerce against
unlawful restraints and monopolies,' by means of publishing and dis-
tributing amongst the wholesale dealers and jobbers lists of resale prices
to be observed in reselling such soap to the retail dealers; by urging all
wholesale dealers and jobbers to adhere to such resale prices; by threat-
ening not to sell to wholesale dealers and jobbers who did not so adhere;
by procuring agreements, written, oral, and tacit, from the wholesale
dealers and jobbers that they would adhere to such resale prices in con-
sideration of being furnished with defendant's soap; and by furnish-
ing such soap to such wholesale dealers and jobbers in consideration
of such agreements;-and more particularly by the following means,"
"United States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc. (192o) slpra note 8.
'Frey & Son, Inc. v. Cudahy Packing Co. (1921) supra note 9.
"Federal Trade Comm. v. Beech-Nut Packing Co. (1922) supra note 7.
' The District Court overruled the demurrer without written opinion.
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etc.5 3 Then follows a long recital of the overt acts alleged to consti-
tute the offense charged. It remains for the jury to decide whether
the course of dealing duly established by the evidence involves
in fact, an agreement or combination between the company and its
dealers to fix and maintain prices for the resale of its products in
restraint of interstate trade.
The Schrader case5 4 again presented the question whether a manu-
facturer may, consistently with the Sherman Act, systematically sell
the articles he makes subject to contracts 55 fixing the price for their
resale. And the court again held that he may not, simply citing the
Miles case as authority for its conclusion.
The District Court sustained a demurrer 6 to an indictment charging
that "the defendant (a manufacturer of automobile accessories) know-
ingly and unlawfully engaged, in the manner hereinafter described,
in a combination with the said tire manufacturers and jobbers to whom
it sold and shipped its products, in restraint of the above-described
trade and commerce among the several States in such products, in vio-
lation of the act of Congress of July 2, 189o, entitled 'An Act to pro-
tect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies;'
that is to say: The defendant executed, and caused all the said tire
manufacturers and jobbers to whom it sold its said products to execute
with it, uniform contracts concerning resales of such products ...
The contracts provided that the products should not be resold at prices
other than those fixed by the defendant. ... etc." The ground upon
which the District Court based its judgment was this: the Sherman
Act, as construed and applied by the Supreme Court in the Colgate
case, does not prohibit such resale price fixing contracts unless they
are made with the purpose to create or maintain an unlawful monopoly
and the indictment neither charges nor recites facts from which it can
be inferred that the defendant made ,the contract in issue with that
purpose. In short, it was held that the opinion and judgment in the
Colgate case are necessarily effective to modify and limit the rule of
the Miles case to the extent stated, that the contracts challenged are not
within that limited rule.
Judge Westenhaver said in the course of his interesting opinion : 5
"The point .... , which I wish to emphasize, is that the allegations
of this indictment, not alleging any purpose, or facts from which such
a purpose can be inferred, to monopolize interstate trade, within the
prohibition and meaning of section 2 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act
and the last clause of Section 2 of the Clayton Act, does not charge a
crime under section i of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act as that act should
'Italics are the author's.
United States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc. (1920) 252 U. S. 85, 40 Sup. Ct. 251.
Here express written contracts.
(1919, N. D. Ohio, E. D.) 264 Fed. 175.
Ibid. 185.
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be construed.... The Sherman Anti-Trust Law, as I construe it in the
absence of other and additional allegations charging an intent and pur-
pose to monopolize trade does not make the acts thus charged a crime."
Upon writ of error the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the
District Court. After restating its opinion in the Colgate case the
court, speaking through Mr. Justice McReynolds, said :58
"The court below misapprehended the meaning and effect of the
opinion and judgment in that cause. We had no intention to overrule
or modify the doctrine of Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co.,
where the effort was to destroy the dealers' independent discretion
through restrictive agreements. Under the interpretation adopted by
the trial court and necessarily accepted by us, the indictment failed to
charge that Colgate & Company made agreements, either express or
implied, which undertook to obligate vendees to observe specified resale
prices; and it was treated 'as alleging only recognition of the manu-
facturer's undoubted right to specify resale prices and refuse to deal
with any one who failed to maintain the same.'
"It seems unnecessary to dwell upon the obvious difference between
the situation presented when a manufacturer merely indicates his wishes
concerning prices and declines further dealings with all who fail to
observe them, and one where he enters into agreements-whether
express or implied from a course of dealing or other circumstances-
with all customers throughout the different States which undertake to
bind them to observe fixed resale prices. In the first, the manufac-
turer but exercised his independent discretion concerning his customers
and there is no contract or combination which imposes any limitation
on the purchaser. In the second, the parties are combined through
agreements designed to take away dealers' control of their own affairs
and thereby destroy competition and restrain the free and natural flow
of trade amongst the States.
".The principles approved in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons
Co. should have been applied."
Mr. Justice Clarke announced that he concurred "in the result."5 9
Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Brandeis dissented, without stated
opinion.
The Schrader case establishes that, first, the rule of the Miles case
is not modified and limited as a result of the opinion and judgment in
the Colgate case; second, the validity of the contracts condemned in
the Miles case is not saved by the fact that they are made without any
purpose to create or maintain an unlawful monopoly; third, such unlaw-
ful contracts may be either express or implied from a course of dealing
or other circumstances.
The ground upon which the court distinguishes the resale price main-
tenance plan approved in the Colgate case from that condemned in the
Miles case is made plain. The Colgate plan presents the simple exer-
cise of the right of freedom of alienation of movables owned, whereas
" United States v. A. Schraders Son, Inc., supra note 54, 99-100, 40 Sup. Ct.
253.
'Ibid. IOO, 40 Sup. Ct. 253.
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the Miles plan involves a restraint by contract upon that right. The
Colgate plan amounts to but the assertion of the right of ownership
before sale, whereas the Miles plan is an attempt to sell movables and
yet by contract to keep them under a restriction hostile to the title con-
veyed and the right of freedom of alienation incident to it. This legal
distinction is clear.
But it cannot be denied that, from a practical standpoint, the two
plans are precisely the same in purpose, economic consequence and
effect upon the buying public, are distinguished in method alone. It is
a fact that they are both designed to maintain prices fixed by the man-
ufacturer for the resale of his products. It is a fact that they both
result in maintaining such prices. It is a fact that the consequence
and effect is, in each instance, that there is no competition in price in
the resale of such products, that the public pays the prices fixed by the
manufacturer. Hence the reality of the situation is that the Colgate
case essentially legalizes what the Miles case outlaws.
Whatever may be the merit of the rule of the Miles case, as to which
the court is divided in its opinion, the soundness and finality of the
rule unanimously affirmed in the Colgate case and later unanimously
reaffirmed in the Beech-Nut case is beyond question. Certainly a
statute enacted to preserve the right of freedom to trade cannot be
construed and applied to destroy it. And no statute would stand for
a moment that is effective to deprive a trader, acting alone in the course
of a private business free from unlawful monopoly, of the right simply
and freely to refuse to sell what he owns, for any or no reason, and thus
to compel him against his will to sell his own private property to others,
to whom he is under no contractual obligation to sell, for their private
use and benefit. Consequently the law cannot be harmonized, from the
standpoint of its practical application, by denying the rule of the Col-
gate case. And if we start with that case it is clear that the Miles
case cannot be distinguished upon the ground that the purpose of the
Miles contracts was to maintain prices fixed by the manufacturer for
the resale of his products, since that was the admitted purpose of the
Colgate plan. Neither can it be distinguished upon the ground that
the result of the Miles contracts was that such prices were maintained,
that there was no competition in price in the resale of the products
subject to them and that the public paid the prices fixed by the manu-
facturer, since that was the admitted result of the Colgate plan. And
we are not permitted to say that the distinguishing consideration is the
presence and absence, respectfully, of a purpose to create or maintain
an unlawful monopoly. Hence we are driven to conclude that the dis-
tinction must exist in the difference in method used to effect a common
purpose and to achieve a common result, in the fact that the method
presented in the Miles case was a system of restrictive contracts,
whereas the method presented in the Colgate case was a simple refusal
YALE LAW JOURNAL
to sell. That is the distinguishing ground as and for the reasons we
have seen.
The dissent of Mr. Justice Brandeis is significant, when viewed in
the light of his opinion in the Boston Store case. Apparently he con-
curs in the opinion of District Judge Westenhaver. Mr. Justice
Holmes presumptively remains steadfast to his dissenting opinion in
the Miles case.
The Frey case60 involved butthe application of established principles.
Frey & Son, Inc., a wholesale grocer, brought suit against the Cudahy
Packing Company in part to recover three-fold damages under section
7 of the Sherman Act' because of injuries claimed to have been sus-
tained in its business by reason of an alleged combination or agreement
between the company and wholesale dealers in one of its products,
known as "Old Dutch Cleanser," to maintain prices fixed by the com-
pany for its resale in violation of that act as construed and applied in
the Miles case. A judgment rendered by the District Court upon the
verdict of a jury in favor of the plaintiff was reversed 62 by the Circuit
Court of Appeals, upon the asserted authority of the Colgate case.
Circuit Judge Woods; speaking for the court, said :6
".. - -there was so little real conflict in the testimony on the vital
issue that except on the measure of damages, the case might well have
been tried without prejudice on the following as an agreed statement
of facts.
"The defendant manufactured and sold Old Dutch Cleanser, and
developed a large trade in that article by extensive advertisements in
newspapers and magazines and by circulars and solicitors. Consider-
ing the maintenance of a fixed price necessary to an adequate profit,
defendant adopted the following means of promoting sales and main-
taining the wholesale price: It sold only to jobbers and wholesalers who
were expected to sell only to retailers. Soliciting agents were sent to
retail merchants, and orders taken from them at the list price, to be
transmitted to any jobber that the retailer named of the jobbers to
whom the defendant was selling. These jobbers selected by defendant,
though called distributing agents, were purchasers to whom defendant
sold at a fixed deduction or discount from the list price. This dis-
count was intended as the jobber's profit. By circulars and personal
interviews jobbers were insistently exhorted to maintain the fixed
prices in their own interest and that of the defendant. The jobbers
knew they were expected to maintain the prices fixed by the defendant
and that they were liable to be cut off if they refused. There was
occasional underselling by dealers, and perhaps occasional disregard by
defendant of isolated acts of underselling. But the plan of the defend-
ant was generally acquiesced in by jobbers, and its requests or demands
'Frey & Son, Inc. v. Cudahy Packinkg Co. (921) 256 U. S. 208, 41 Sup.
Ct. 451.
Act of July 2, 18go (26 Stat. at L. 2o9). Sec. 7 is at p. 2IO.
' (ig g, C. C. A. 4th) 261 Fed. 65. (See also Welch Grape Juice Co. v. Frey
& Son, Inc. (igig, C. C. A. 4th) 261 Fed. 68).
63 261 Fed. at pp. 66-67.
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that the prices be maintained were generally complied with. There
was no formal written or oral agreement with jobbers for the main-
tenance of prices.
"The plaintiff was a jobber on defendant's list of 'distributing agents,'
who had a considerable trade in Old Dutch Cleanser. Believing that
by the elimination of certain expenses usually incident to the wholesale
business, it could afford to sell Old Dutch Cleanser at less than the
price enjoined by defendant, plaintiff reduced the price below that fixed
by defendant. For that reason the defendant refused to sell plaintiff
at its usual discount from the list price, thus cutting off its business by
making it impossible for it to compete with other jobbers at a profit.
"The vital question is whether defendant's method of business,
coupled with the acquiescence of its customers therein by observing its
requests or demands to maintain prices, was such co-operation between
seller and purchasers as amounted to a combination in restraint of
trade within the rule laid down in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park &
Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373 . ... and other following cases. We are
obliged to hold that the question has been clearly answered in the nega-
tive by the Supreme Court in United States of America v. Colgate
& Co., 250 U. S. 300 .... decided June 2, 1919. The court expressly
held that the announcement in advance that customers were expected
to charge a price fixed by the seller and that the penalty for refusal to
maintain prices would be refusal to sell to the offending customer,
observance of the request to maintain prices by customers generally,
and the actual enforcement of the penalty by refusal to sell to such cus-
tomers as failed to maintain the price, did not constitute a violation of
the trust statute. Nothing more was done by the defendant and its
customers in this case."
Upon writ of error the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the
Circuit Court of Appeals, holding that although the Circuit Court of
Appeals had erred in saying that a verdict for the defendant should
have been directed, and although the trial court had been correct in
leaving the facts to the jury, yet that "as given the instruction was
erroneous and material.
'64
Frey & Son, Inc. v. Cudahy Packing Co., supra note 6o. This case was not
retried in the District Court.
The Supreme Court, again speaking through Mr. Justice McReynolds, said
(Ibid. 210-211, 41 Sup. Ct. 451-452) :
"The court below concluded 'There was no formal written or oral agreement
with jobbers for the maintenance of prices,' and that considering the doctrine
approved in United States v. Colgate & Co. the District Court should have
directed a verdict for the defendant. Other errors by the trial court were
assigned and relied upon. If any of them was well taken we must affirm the
final judgment entered after waiver of new trial and upon consent as above
shown. It is unnecessary to repeat what we said in United States v. Colgate &
Co. and United States v. Schrader's Son, Inc. Apparently the former case was
misapprehended. The latter opinion distinctly stated that the essential agree-
ment, combination or conspiracy might be implied from a course of dealing or
other circumstances. Having regard to the course of dealing and all the perti-
nent facts disclosed by the present record, we think whether there existed an
unlawful combination or agreement between the manufacturer and jobbers was
a question for the jury to decide, and that the Circuit Court of Appeals erred
when it held otherwise.
"Among other things the trial court charged: 'I can only say to you that if
you shall find that the defendant indicated a sales plan to the wholesalers and
27
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Mr. Justice Pitney filed a dissenting opinion,
65 in which Mr. Justice
Day and Mr. Justice Clarke concurred.
The value of the Frey case is this: first, it records a course of dealing
to be submitted to the jury to decide whether it involves, in fact and
by necessary or reasonable implication, a combination or agreement
between a manufacturer and his dealers to maintain prices fixed by him
for the resale of his products in restraint of interstate trade; second, it
illustrates the narrow margin that may separate a lawful plan of simple
refusal to sell from an unlawful combination or agreement inferred
from a course of dealing built upon but transcending the limitations
of that plan.
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Pitney is interesting in that
it is the opinion of three members of the court. Moreover it contains
an interesting discussion of the subject under consideration.
We now come to the Beech-Nut case.
6 6 It is distinguished from the
prior cases in that it arose under the Federal Trade Commission Act
6 7
which, in Section 5, empowers and directs the Commission to prevent
the use of unfair methods of competition in interstate and foreign
commerce "if it shall appear to the Commission that a proceeding by it
in respect thereof would be to the interest of the public." The ques-
tion presented was whether the Commission is empowered by the act
to order "that respondent, Beech-Nut Packing Company, its officers,
directors, agents, servants, and employees cease and desist from directly
or indirectly recommending, requiring, or by any means bringing about
the resale of Beech-Nut products by distributors, whether at whole-
sale or retail, according to any system of prices fixed or established
by respondent, and more particularly by any or all of the following
means: i. Refusing to sell to any such distributors because of their
failure to adhere to any such system of resale prices; 2. Refusing to
sell to any such distributors because of their having resold respondent's
said products to other distributors who have failed to adhere to any
such system of resale prices; 3. Securing or seeking to secure co6pera-
ation of its distributors in maintaining or enforcing any such system
of resale prices; 4. Carrying out or causing others to carry out a resale
price maintenance policy by any other means."
jobbers, which plan fixed the price below which the wholesalers and jobbers
were not to sell to retailers, and you find defendant called this particular feature
of this plan to their attention on very many different occasions, and you find the
great majority of them not only expressing no dissent from such plan, but actually
co6perating in carrying it out by themselves selling at.the prices named, you may
reasonably find from such fact that there was an agreement or combination
forbidden by the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.'
"The recited facts, standing alone (there were other pregnant ones) did not
suffice to establish an agreement or combination forbidden by the Sherman Act.
This we pointed out in United States v. Colgate & Co. As given the instruction
was erroneous and material."
' Ibid. 211 et seq., 41 Sup. Ct. 452 et seq.
'Federal Trade Comm. v. Beech--Nt Packing Co. (1922) 257 U. S. 441, 42
Sup. Ct. 150.
"Act of Sept. 26, 1914 (38 Stat. at L. 717). Sec. 5 is at p. 719.
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The facts found and upon which the order was based were essen-
tially these:68 The Beech-Nut Packing Company is engaged in the
business of manufacturing divers food products and chewing gum and
selling such products to wholesale dealers, principally, throughout the
United States, who are selected by it as desirable customers for the
reason that they are known or believed by it to be of good credit stand-
ing, willing to and do resell at prices suggested by it, willing to and
do refuse to sell to other dealers who do not resell at such prices, and
are good and satisfactory merchandisers in other respects. The total
number of dealers handling Beech-Nut products includes the greater
proportion of the wholesale and retail dealers in the grocery trade and
a large proportion of the wholesale and retail dealers in the drug,
candy, and tobacco trades, throughout the United States. In the sale
of its products the company adopted and maintains the "Beech-Nut
Policy," so-called, the announced policy of refusing sales to dealers
who do not sell Beech-Nut products at prices suggested by it or sell to
other dealers who do not charge such prices, and requests the codpera-
tion therein of all dealers in its products, dealing with each customer
separately. In order to carry out its said policy and to secure such
co-operation, the company (a) issues circulars, price lists, and letters
to the trade generally showing suggested uniform resale prices, whole-
sale and retail, to be charged for Beech-Nut products; (b) requests
and insists that its selected dealers resell only at such prices; (c)
requests and insists that its selected dealers sell only to such other
dealers as have been and are Willing to and do resell at such
prices and that they discontinue selling to other dealers who
fail to resell at such prices; (d) makes it known broadcast
to its selected dealers that if they fail to resell at such prices it will
refuse to sell further supplies of its products to them, that it will also
refuse to sell to dealers who sell to other dealers failing to resell at such
prices. In carrying out its said policy the company (a) has refused
and does refuse to sell its products to practically all dealers who do not
resell at its suggested prices; (b) has refused and does refuse to sell
to practically all dealers who sell to other dealers who have failed to
resell at such prices; (c) has refused and does refuse to sell to prac-
tically all so-called mail-order houses engaged in interstate commerce,
because they frequently sell at cut prices, and has refused and does
refuse to sell to practically all dealers who sell its products to such mail
order houses; (d) has refused and does refuse to sell to practically all
so-called "price-cutters ;" (e) has maintained and does maintain a large
force of so-called "specialty salesmen!' or "representatives" who call
upon the retail trade and solicit orders from them to be filled through
jobbers and wholesalers, commonly known in the trade as "turnover
orders," and who, under its instructions, have refused and do refuse
to accept any such turnover orders to be filled through jobbers and
' The essential facts found are here literally stated.
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wholesalers who sell or have sold at less than the suggested resale prices
or sell or have sold to other dealers who sell or have sold at less than
such prices, and in such cases have requested the retailers to name other
jobbers; (f) has reinstated and does reinstate as distributors of its
products dealers previously cut off or withdrawn from the list of
selected dealers for failure to resell at its suggested prices and / or for
selling to distributors who do not maintain such prices, upon the basis
of declarations, assurances, statements, promises and similar expres-
sions, as the case may be, by said distributors, respectively, which
satisfy it that they will thereafter resell at its suggested prices and /
or will refuse to sell to distributors who do not maintain such prices;
(g) has added and does add to its list of new distributors, concerns
reported by its representatives as declaring that they intend to and will
resell at its suggested prices and / or will refuse to sell to distributors
who do not maintain such prices; (h) has utilized a system of key
numbers or symbols stamped or marked upon the cases containing its
products, thus enabling it, for any purpose, to ascertain the identity
of the distributors from whom such products were purchased, and when
instances of price cutting have been reported to it by the selected dealers
or ascertained in other ways its salesmen and representatives have been
repeatedly instructed by it to investigate, and that in pursuance of these
instructions its salesmen and representatives have by means of these
key numbers or symbols traced the price cutters from whom the goods
have been obtained and have thus ascertained the identity of such price
cutters and have also thus traced and ascertained the identity of dis-
tributors from whom price cutters have purchased its products, and
have thereafter refused to supply all such dealers with its products,
whether they were cutting the suggested prices or selling to dealers
who do so; (i) has maintained and does maintain card records con-
taining the names of thousands of dealers, including its selected dis-
tributors, and in furtherance of its refusals to sell goods to distributors
selling at less than the suggested prices or to other distributors selling
at less than such prices has listed upon said cards the words "Undesir-
able-Price Cutters," "Do Not Sell," or "D. N. S.," the abbreviation
for "Do Not Sell," or expressions of a like character, to indicate
that the particular distributor was not, in the future, to be supplied
with its goods, on account of failure either to maintain the suggested
prices or to discontinue selling to dealers failing to maintain such prices.
When the company has received declarations, assurances, statements,
promises, and similar expressions, as the case may be, by said distri-
butors, respectively, which satisfy it that they will resell at the sug-
gested prices and / or discontinue selling to distributors failing to main-
tain such prices, it has issued instructions to "Clear the record," or
directions of similar import, notation of which is made on the cards,
and has thereafter permitted shipments of its products to be made to
such distributors; and such distributors to whom shipments are thug
allowed to go forward constitute the company's list of so-called
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"selected" dealers, and no distributor is thus listed on such card records
as one to whom goods are allowed to go forward who fails to main-
tain the suggested resale prices or sells to distributors failing to resell
at such prices; and when a distributor is reported as failing to main-
tain the suggested resale prices and / or as selling 'to distributors who
fail to maintain such prices and has been entered in said card records
as one to whom shipments should not go forward, the company notifies
those who supply said distributor of this fact and also its specialty
salesmen and gives similar notices to its distributors and specialty sales-
men when reinstatements are made in its said list of selected distributors.
The Commission neither charged nor found that the company's busi-
ness involved unlawful monopoly; that the company entered into any
agreement or understanding with its dealers to fix and maintain resale
prices. On the contrary, the Commission, upon its own motion,
amended its formal complaint against the company to strike out the
charge of such an agreement originally contained in it and formally
found that "the merchandising conduct of respondent, heretofore
defined and as herein involved, does not constitute a contract or con-
tracts whereby resale prices are fixed, maintained, and enforced." And
it was neither charged nor found that the suggested prices were unrea-
sonable.
Upon petition by the company to review and set aside the Commis-
sion's said order because of want of power to make it, the Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed it,6 9 holding that the Commission's conclusion that
the methods found are unfair within the meaning and condemnation
of the act cannot be sustained in the face of the decision in the Colgate
case.
7 0
(1920, C. C. A. 2d) 264 Fed. 885.
: Circuit Judge Ward delivered the opinion of the court in which it was said
(ibid. 889) : "The subject is one affecting the public generally, and plainly within
the jurisdiction of the commission. The ground upon which the conclusion of
law rests is that the method is unfair, because it stifles competition and so
restrains trade. The obvious purpose of the respondent is to prevent any
competition as to the resale price between purchasers of its products. Such a
method, founded upon an agreement between a manufacturer and purchasers
severally, was held to be a violation of the Sherman Act in Dr. Miles Medical
Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373 * * * It is difficult to say why a different
conclusion should be reached, if the same result is attained by acquiescence and
co6peration without express agreement between the manufacturer and his pur-
chasers severally. Eastern States Retail Lumber Association v. UntHd States,
234 U. S. 6oo * * * But we understand the Supreme Court to hold in United States
v. Colgate & Co., 250 U. S. 300 * * * that a similar, but less drastic, method of
sale constitutes merely the exercise of a man's right to do what he will with
his own, and is not obnoxious to the Sherman Act. The facts as found by the
commission, being supported by testimony, are conclusive; but the effect of them
is a question of law, to be expressed in a conclusion of law, and the commission
so describes it. We do not see how this conclusion can be sustained, in the
face of the decision in the Colgate case." Circuit Judge Manton filed a con-
curring opinion. (Ibid. 889-892.)
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Upon writ of certiorari the Supreme Court reversed71 the judg-
ment of the Circuit Court of Appeals upon the ground that the
company carried its "Beech-Nut Policy," so-called, into effect by the
use of "unfair methods of competition" within the meaning and con-
demnation of the act. But the court further held that the order is too
broad and must be modified as in the manner later stated.
After reviewing the complaint and facts found and stating the opin-
ion and judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals, the court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Day, carefully restated its prior decisions upon the
subject. In the course of the opinion it said :72
"The Colgate Case was prosecuted under the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act and came to this court under the Criminal Appeals Act. We
therein held that this court must accept the construction of the indict-
ment as made in the District Court; and, that, upon such construction,
the only act charged amounted to the exercise of the right of the trader,
or manufacturer, engaged in private business, to exercise his own dis-
cretion as to those with whom he would deal, and to announce the cir-
cumstances under which he would refuse to sell, and that, thus
interpreted, no act was charged in the indictment which amounted to a
violation of the Sherman Act, prohibiting monopolies, contracts, com-
binations and conspiracies in restraint of interstate commerce....
"The Sherman Act," continued the court,7 3 "is not involved here
except in so far as it shows a declaration of public policy to be con-
sidered in determining what are unfair methods of competition, which
the Federal Trade Commission is empowered to condemn and suppress.
The case now before us was begun under the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act which was intended to supplement previous anti-trust legis-
lation....
"Of the Federal Trade Commission Act we said, in Federal Trade
Commission v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 421, 427: 'The words "unfair methods
of competition" are not defined by the statute and their exact meaning
is in dispute. It is for the courts, not the Commission, ultimately to
determine as matter of law what they include. They are clearly inap-
plicable to practices never heretofore regarded as opposed to good
morals because characterized by deception, bad faith, fraud or oppres-
sion, or as against public policy because of their dangerous tendency
unduly to hinder competition or create monopoly. The act was cer-
tainly not intended to fetter free and fair competition as commonly
understood and practised by honorable opponents in trade.'
"If the 'Beech-Nut System of Merchandising' is against public pol-
icy because of its 'dangerous tendency unduly to hinder competition or
create monopoly,' it is within the power of the Commission to make an
order fqrbidding its continuation."
Applying this test to the facts found, the court holds that the Beech-
Nut system is against public policy upon the ground stated, wherefore
the Commission is empowered to order its discontinuance. With
reference to the particular circumstances of the case at bar, it said :71
' Federal Trade Comm. v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., supra note 66.
'Ibid. 451-452, 42 Sup. Ct. 153-,54.
" Ibid. 453-454, 42 Sup. Ct. 54.
"'Ibid. 455, 42 Sup. Ct. I55.
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"The specific facts found show suppression of the freedom of com-
petition by methods in which the company secures the co-operation of
its distributors and customers, which are quite as effectual as agree-
ments express or implied intended to accomplish the same purpose.
By these methods the company, although selling its products at prices
satisfactory to it, is enabled to prevent competition in their subsequent
disposition by preventing all who do not sell at resale prices fixed by
it from obtaining its goods.
"Under the facts established, we have no doubt of the authority and
power of the Commission to order a discontinuance of practices in
trading, such as are embodied in the system of the Beech-Nut Com-
pany."
"We are, however, of opinion," the court added,75 in conclusion,
"that the order of the Commission is too broad. The order should have
required the company to cease and desist from carrying into effect its
so-called Beech-Nut Policy by co-operative methods in which the
respondent and its distributors, customers and agents undertake to pre-
vent others from obtaining the company's products at less than the
prices designated by it-(i) by the practice of reporting the names
of dealers who do not observe such resale prices; (2) by causing dealers
to be enrolled upon lists of undesirable purchasers who are not to be
supplied with the products of the company unless and until they have
given satisfactory assurances of their purpose to maintain such desig-
nated prices in the future; (3) by employing salesmen or agents to
assist in such plan by reporting dealers who do not observe such
resale prices, and giving orders of purchase only to such jobbers and
wholesalers as sell at the suggested prices and refusing to give such
orders to dealers who sell at less than such prices, or who sell to others
who sell at less than such prices; (4) by utilizing numbers and symbols
marked upon cases containing their products with a view to ascertain-
ing the names of dealers who sell the company's products at less than
the suggested prices, or who sell to others who sell at less than such
prices in order to prevent such dealers from obtaining the products of
the company; or (5) by utilizing any other equivalent co-operative
means of accomplishing the maintenance of prices fixed by the com-
pany."
The court divided five to four in the decision of this case. Mr. jus-
tice Holmes filed a dissenting opinion, in which Mr. Justice McKenna
and Mr. Justice Brandeis concurred.76 Mr. Justice McReynolds, who,
=Ibid. 455-456, 42 Sup. Ct. 155.
In his dissenting opinion Mr. Justice Holmes said (Ibid. 456-457, 42 Sup. Ct.
155-156):
"There are obvious limits of propriety to the persistent expression of opinions
that do not command the agreement of the court. But as this case presents a
somewhat new field-the determination of what is unfair competition within
the meaning of the Federal Trade Commission Act-I venture a few words to
explain my dissent. I will not recur to fundamental questions. The ground
on which the respondent is held guilty is that its conduct has a dangerous tendency
unduly to hinder competition or to create monopoly. It is enough to say that this
I cannot understand. So far as the Sherman Act is concerned I had supposed
that its policy was aimed against attempts to create a monopoly in the doers of
the condemned act or to hinder competition with them. Of course there can be
nothing of that sort here. The respondent already has the monopoly of its
own goods with the full assent of the law and no one can compete with it with
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as we have seen, wrote the opinion of the court in the Colgate, Schrader,
and Frey cases, also filed a dissenting opinion.
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In explanation of and comment upon the opinion and judgment of
the court in the Beech-Nut case, we may say:
First. The Beech-Nut course of dealing is held to be without the
rule of the Colgate case because it goes far beyond the simple refusal
to sell there presented and sustained, and involves sales made by
the use of methods by which the company secures the coaperation of
its dealers to maintain prices fixed by it for the resale of its products.
Second. The Beech-Nut course of dealing is held to involve the
use of the "unfair methods of competition" outlawed by the Federal
Trade Commission Act, enacted to supplement the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act, upon the ground that it is against public policy because it
has a dangerous tendency unduly to hinder competition, and more, it
necessarily constitutes a scheme which restrains the natural flow of
commerce and suppresses the freedom of competition in the channels
of interstate trade which it has been the purpose of all the anti-trust
acts to maintain.78 This for the reason that in its practical operation
it necessarily constrains the trader to maintain the prices suggested by
the company if he would have and deal in its products. It matters not
that this course of dealing is found by the Commission not to consti-
tute a contract or contracts whereby resale prices are fixed, maintained
and enforced, since the specific facts found show suppression of the
freedom of competition in the resale of Beech-Nut products by methods
in which the company secures the cooperation of its distributors and
customers, which are quite as effectual as agreements, express or
implied, intended to accomplish. the same purpose. 'And the validity
of these methods is not saved by the circumstance that they are used
incidental to and in furtherance of the lawful plan of simple refusal
to sell, since they transcend its limitations as and to the extent stated.
regard to those goods, which are the only ones concerned. It seems obvious
that respondent is not creating a monopoly in them for anyone else, although I.
see nothing to hinder its doing so by conveying them all to a single vendee.
The worst that can be said, so far as I see, is that it hinders competition among
those who purchase from it. But it seems to me that the very foundation of the
policy of the law to keep competition open is that the subject-matter of the
competition would be open to 'all but for the hindrance complained of. I
cannot see what that policy has to do with a subject-matter that comes from a
single hand that is admitted to be free to shut as closely as it will. And, to
come back to the words of the statute, I cannot see how it is unfair competition
to say to those to whom the respondent sells, and to the world, you can have my
goods only on the terms I propose, when the existence of any competition in
dealing with them depends up on the respondent's wil. I see no wrong in so
doing, and if I did I should not think it a wrong within the possible scope of
the word unfair. Many unfair devices have been exposed in suits under the
Sherman Act, but to whom the respondent's conduct is unfair I do not
understand."
Ibid. 458-459, 42 Sup. Ct. 156.
' Thus the Beech-Nut course of dealing, in the opinion of the court, amounts
to a combination to fix prices in restraint of interstate trade in violation of the
Sherman Act.
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Third. The vice of the Beech-4Nut course of dealing is held to be
this: It embraces methods involving codperation between the company
and its dealers whereby together and in pursuance of a common plan
they undertake to p'revent those who do not resell at its stated prices
from obtaining its products and others from obtaining them at less
than such prices, by which methods the company, although selling its
products at prices satisfactory to it, is enabled to prevent competition
in their subsequent disposition. It is because the company sought and
secured the active participation and aid of its dealers in carrying into
effect its plan of resale price maintenance,"9 whereby they act together
and in cobperation to maintain the prices fixed by it for the resale of
its products, that it is held to violate the act. That is the co6pera-
tion found by the Commission and forbidden in its order. That is the
cobperation condemned by the court in its opinion. That is the codp-
eration, it is submitted, against which the modified order is directed.
Fourth. The order of the Commission is, upon its face, broadly
designed and unquestionably effective, if valid and enforced, to pre-
vent the entire practice of resale price maintenance, by whatever means
pursued by the company. The company is ordered to cease and desist,
inter alia, from simply recommending resale prices for its products, and
from simply refusing sales to those who sell at other prices or to those
who sell at other prices. The company is further ordered to cease and
desist from securing or seeking to secure the cobperation of its dis-
tributors in maintaining or enforcing its system of resale prices. And
the court holds that the order is too broad, manifestly for the reason
and to the extent, at least, that it forbids the simple recommendation
and refusal to sell stated, which in the Colgate case was held to
be within the legal right of a manufacturer, that it must be modified
and limited as stated.
Fifth. The modified order defined by the court is phrased in broad
and ambiguous language which leaves its precise meaning and applica-
tion in doubt, when it is read literally and by itself. It is necessary to
construe it. And it must be construed, of course, in the light of the
definitive facts found, of the definitive terms of the order of which it
is a modification, of the definitive opinion of the court. So construed,
it is effective, we think, to require the company to cease and desist from
carrying into effect its "Beech-Nut Policy," so-called, hitherto defined,
by the use of coiperative methods whereby the company (whether
acting directly or through its agents) and its dealers together under-
take to prevent those who do not resell at its stated prices from obtain-
ing its products and others from obtaining them at less than such prices.
"As by requesting dealers to report to it and by reporting to dealers the names
of price cutters in order to prevent them from obtaining its products; as also
by refusing sales to dealers unless and until they give satisfactory assurances of
their purpose to maintain the prices stated by it and to refrain from selling to
those who do not maintain such prices.
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Sixth. It has been thought and said that as a result of the opinion
and judgment of the court in this case the plan of simple refusal to sell,
unanimously sustained in the Colgate case and again here, is made
ineffectual and hence the rule of that case is, for all practical purposes,
nullified. This for the asserted reason, principally, that the modified
order here directed to be entered is effective to define any and all
reporting of price cutters to the manufacturer by his agents in pursuance
and furtherance of that plan as unlawful co6peration and therefore to
forbid it. And attention is directed, in support of this assertion, to the
language used in defining the first and third practices enumerated and
forbidden in the modified order. This construction we are constrained
to reject because, as we think, unwarranted and unreasonable. In the
first place, it is indisputable that the plan of simple refusal to sell
sustained in the Colgate case does not, per se, involve unlawful co6pera-
tion, albeit it is designed and effective to maintain the prices stated by
the manufacturer. In the second place, there can be no co6peration in
a legal sense between a manufacturer and his agents with respect to
action by and between them alone in the due course of their business
relationship, since they are legally but one. The agents act only for
and in the name of the manufacturer, as his alter ego. It in no way
derogates from the otherwise inherently lawful conduct of the manu-
facturer that he acts, as he must usually act, through agents, since what-
ever he has the legal right himself to do he may legally do through them.
In the third place, the practices specifically enumerated and forbidden in
the modified order must be read in the light of the general scope and
purpose of the order precisely defined by the court to be directed against
methods involving the cobperation condemned. In the fourth place,
the co6peration found by the Commission and forbidden in its order
and the co6peration condemned by the court in its opinion is plainly
and unequivocally defined to be codperation between the company and
its dealers to maintain prices fixed by it for the resale of its products.
The modified order forbids the company from using any and all methods
involving such co6peration with its dealers, whether it acts directly or
through its agents. The order has no application whatever to the use
by the company of methods which do not involve such co6peration,
whether it acts directly or through its agents. Suppose the recipient
of this order was an individual manufacturer instead of the company.
Surely no one would contend for a moment that he was forbidden by its
terms from personally reading in the press or on posters in their stores
the prices charged for his products by his dealers, respectively,. and
then carrying the plan of simple refusal to 'sell into effect upon the basis
of the information thus secured. And it will not be reasonably said
that the manufacturer cannot do precisely the same thing through his
agents, who are but his eyes, ears and hands. In short, the reporting
of price-cutters to the manufacturer by his agents may or may not
involve the condemned and forbidden co6peration between him and his
dealers. If the manufacturer acts independently, as in the case
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supposed, there is no such cobperation in fact or law. If, on the
other hand, the agent acts in the r6le of a messenger between one
dealer and the manufacturer to report and prevent sales to another
dealer, then the situation is quite different and there is present the
co6peration condemned. Moreover, in exercising its statutory power
to modify an order of the Commission, as here, the court is not
empowered to extend its explicitly defined application. In the fifth
place, the plan of simple refusal to sell involves the exercise of a real,
practical and great trade right, the exertion of a fundamental legal
right, the assertion of the liberty secured by the constitution of the
United States. This being so, it cannot reasonably be said that this
right may not be enjoyed in the practical conception and conduct of
trade, within the broad limitations defined in the Colgate case, that
while it cannot be directly denied it may be indirectly destroyed by for-
bidding the use of the bare means essential to its practical exercise and
realization, where such means are used strictly within the limitations
indicated. It seems to us clear that this right is necessarily designed
to be, and hence may be, fully and freely enjoyed in the practical con-
ception and conduct of trade, so long as the manufacturer acts alone
in the course of a private business free from unlawful monopoly. And
it makes no difference whether he acts personally or through his author-
ized agents. Any other construction of the law would do violence to
reason and common sense and reduced a supposed and assured con-
stitutional right to a fiction.
Seventh. The opinion in this case is of the greatest value for the
reason that it authoritatively reviews and conclusively sums up the law
upon the subject. It is effective to define, on the one hand, the extent
to which public policy, declared by the anti-trust acts, permits a trader
to go in the direction of maintaining prices stated by him for the resale
of his products, and, on the other hand, the extent to which that policy
will not permit him to go in that direction.
Eighth. It will be observed that the order of the Commission is
effective to forbid the company even from using methods strictly
limited to prevent the resale of its products at prices higher than those
stated by it, whereas the modified order requires the company to cease
and desist from using co6perative methods to prevent the buying pub-
lic from obtaining its products at less than its stated prices. Thus the
application of the anti-trust acts is made clear.
Ninth. We may add that the question remains open whether the
rule of this case is settled law, since, first, the court is almost evenly
divided in its opinion; second, three of the five members of the court
deciding the case have since retired. 0
" The case of Mishawaka Woolen Mfg. Co. v. Federal Trade Comm. (1922,
C. C. A. 7th) 283 Fed. 1o22, certiorari refused by the Supreme Court on January
8. 1923, involves but the application of principles established by the prior cases.
